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Abstract 
To counter the charge that it is an elite-driven political project, the European Union 
increasingly uses online systems to render its working practices visible to its citizens.  This 
article analyses how the actors involved in European Union policy-making understand the 
benefits derived from providing information through e-transparency, and examines whether 
they consider that the e-transparency systems deliver these benefits.  Drawing on data from 63 
semi-structured interviews with officials, Members of the European Parliament and Brussels-
based transparency campaigners, the article shows a wide variation in participants’ views 
concerning the rationale for e-transparency.  It shows that e-transparency is variously seen as 
the means to address declining citizen trust in the Brussels institutions; as a mechanism through 
which citizens can participate in European Union processes and as a means of holding its 
institutions to account. The article argues that these various e-transparency attributes are 
contradictory, and it advances a framework for information providers to assess how the e-
transparency tools can best meet the differing requirements of transparency users. 
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How European Union policy actors use and assess the effectiveness of e -transparency  
In a speech to the European Parliament (EP) in May 2016, Commission Vice President 
Timmermans stated that ‘Transparency is one of the few tools we have to reconnect with  
citizens who are sceptical of our legislature’.  Whilst a growing antipathy towards mainstream 
politics is not peculiar to the European Union (EU), Timmermans’ statement speaks to the 
particular challenge of countering the EU’s public image as an elite-driven political project1.   
To mitigate the charge that the EU is too remote, it increasingly uses online systems to render 
its working practices visible to its citizens.  There is not, however, a single model of e-
transparency, with different EU institutions having varying and sometimes contradictory logics 
for using e-transparency to reconnect with the public. This paper explains how different groups 
of EU policy actors understand the benefits derived from providing information through e-
transparency systems and examines whether they consider the e-transparency tools to be 
effective in delivering these benefits.  Using data drawn from 63 semi-structured interviews 
with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), officials from the EU institutions and 
representatives of transparency advocacy groups, this article reveals clear differences between 
the rationale for e-transparency between elected representatives, unelected officials and 
campaigners.   By considering and explaining how e-transparency is intended to serve multip le 
purposes, the article adds to the relatively small but growing body of empirical transparency 
studies (Douglas and Meijer, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013) and contributes to the wider 
discourse about the functioning of e-government (Ionescu, 2015; Welch, 2012). 
The article proceeds as follows.  The first section shows that scholars define and conceptualise 
transparency and e-transparency in different ways, and identifies the overlaps between the 
literature on transparency in general and e-transparency in particular.  The second section 
explains the paper’s data gathering approach before section three describes the research 
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findings.  Section four discusses the implications of the distinct differences amongst policy 
actors concerning the purpose and effectiveness of e-transparency.  Overall, the article shows 
that e-transparency is used by different actors and groups to serve different purposes and that, 
in effect, this leads to multiple transparencies that can create a complex and often contradictory 
transparency picture.   
Whilst there is growing academic interest in EU transparency, the ongoing financial crisis has 
provided the backdrop for recent work, most of which has explored transparency in the context 
of the EU’s corporate and financial sectors (Bellenca and Vandernoot, 2014; Horvath and 
Vasko, 2016).  This article focuses instead on transparency as it is practiced in the public realm.   
Before considering these perspectives in detail, however, the article considers how the terms 
transparency, e-transparency and effectiveness are defined and conceptualised. 
Defining and conceptualising transparency and e-transparency 
Transparency 
Academic definitions of transparency tend to focus on either its process or purpose, although 
with some overlap.  For the former, the emphasis is on the degree to which an organisat ion 
makes explicit information concerning aspects such as its decision-making processes, 
performance and procedures (Curtin and Meijer, 2006; Welch et al., 2005).  Welch et al., for 
example, define transparency as ‘the availability of information for navigating a large-scale 
social system’ (2005, p. 378).  For this article - with its emphasis on transparency as it is 
understood by those involved - this approach is rather limiting, as its focus is on measuring the 
provision of information, rather than the rationale for providing the information in the first 
place.  An alternative approach considers transparency in purposive terms.  This often views 
transparency as a means of exercising discipline over institutions and office holders by making 
information about their performance public and thus deterring corrupt practices and poor 
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performance (O’ Neill, in Etzioni, 2010, p.393).  This stress on countering malpractice is also 
reflected in Hood’s work on the relationship between transparency and governance which 
defines transparency as ‘Government according to fixed and published rules, on the basis of 
information and procedures that are accessible to the public’ (Hood, 2006, p.701).    
Although it is broader in meaning than that offered by Welch et al, for this article Hood’s 
definition is also found wanting.  Both Hood and Welch et al. focus on the top down provision 
of information, but neither captures the practical elements that render transparency practicable, 
such as the specificity of the measures needed to ensure accessibility of information.   Neither 
is the EU’s own definition sufficient for this paper, largely because there is no single EU 
definition of transparency.  Rather, each institution has its own definition based on institutiona l 
function.  The Commission, for example, refers to transparency as ‘The right of citizens to 
know how European institutions prepare decisions, who participates in preparing them, who 
receives funding from the EU budget, and what documents are held or produced to prepare and 
adopt the legal acts’ (European Commission, 2016).  The European Parliament’s definition is 
rather more tightly drawn, referring to transparency as a means for ‘…facilitating citizens' 
scrutiny over Parliament's activities and, in particular, its legislative work’ (European 
Parliament, 2017), whilst the Court of Auditors states that transparency is a means for 
‘disclosing information about our management and activities, and publishing the results of our 
audit work’ (European Court of Auditors, 2017). 
Definitions used by other transparency providers are also rather narrowly circumscribed.  For 
example, the first report of the British Committee on Standards in Public Life simply refers to 
‘…holders of public office [being] as open a possible about all the decisions and actions they 
take’ (Nolan, 1995, p.14).  Notably, however, the same committee later broadened the scope 
of this definition, with its most recent iteration published on the British Government website: 
‘Transparency is not just about access to data, but also making sure that it is released in an 
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open, reusable format’ (HM Government, 2016).  Here the committee’s definition marks a 
change of tone from transparency as an overarching principle intended to guide policymakers 
towards transparency as a set of practical measures delivered by online processes: a shift from 
transparency to e-transparency.    
E-transparency  
The increase in the provision of information on EU processes has mirrored technologica l 
developments, with recent transparency innovations employing exclusively online processes.  
This move towards online transparency has, unsurprisingly, reflected the rapid growth in 
internet access: under 10% of EU citizens had access to the internet in 2000 against over 90% 
in 2016 (Eurostat, 2016).   This shift towards transparency provided through online systems 
has a number of labels, including ‘computer-mediated transparency’ (Meijer, 2009) and ICT-
enabled transparency (Bannister and Connolly, 2012).  For consistency, this article uses the 
term e-transparency throughout.   
For Railine (2015), e-transparency has all the characteristics of general transparency but 
delivered using information and communication technology (ICT).  Nonetheless, scholarly 
definitions of e-transparency have tended to focus on specific aspects.  It follows that, so far as 
practicable, a definition of e-transparency should try to capture these different traits.  By 
synthesising scholarship, the information provided through e-transparency tools can be 
assessed not just in terms of its completeness (Drew and Nyerges, 2004), but also usability 
(Mahler and Regan, 2007) and accuracy (Jaeger and Bertot, 2010).  In addition, Heald (2006) 
distinguishes between information being made available in real time and retrospectively, and 
Héritier (2003) emphasises the importance of public accessibility to information.  By 
combining the features covered in the wider academic literature, a reasonably comprehens ive 
set of criteria can be established in order to provide a suitable definition of e-transparency for 
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this article.  Table 1 summarises the main features of transparency identified in the academic 
literature applying them to the EU’s e-transparency tools. 
Table 1. Features of e-transparency. 
Feature: Associated with: Operationalised as: 
Accuracy  Jaeger and Bertot, 
2010. 
Does e-transparency provide user with 
factually correct information? 
Completeness  Drew and Nyerges, 
2004. 
Does e-transparency provide user with 
all relevant information without 
omissions? 
Accessibility Héritier, 2003.  Does e-transparency have mult ip le 
access points?  Can a non-specialis t 
easily navigate the online systems? 
Timeliness  Heald, 2006. Is e-transparency provided in real time or 
retrospectively?  If the latter, is delay for 
operational reasons?  
Usability  
 
Mahler and Regan, 
2007. 
Does e-transparency provide 
information in an accessible format (e.g. 
in multiple languages/in a searchable 
form).  
 
This article therefore advances a tailored definition of the EU’s e-transparency processes that 
captures the features at table 1.  Thus, for this article, e-transparency is defined as: Online 
access to timely, complete, usable and accurate information on the EU policy process.   
Conceptually, e-transparency relates to broader issues of e-government and e-democracy.  E-
government refers to the use of technology tools to provide government services and 
information (Welch et al., 2005), whilst e-democracy refers to the use of technology tools to 
allow citizens to participate in governance (Bannister and Connolly, 2012).  The EU’s e-
transparency serves both purposes:  it provides public access to information and serves as a 
channel through which the public can participate in the decision-making process.   
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In their wide-ranging review of transparency research, Porumbescu and Grimmelikhuijsen 
(2016) identified a marked increase from around 2005 of the publication of public 
administration articles focusing on transparency.   However, most of this work has analysed 
transparency as an independent variable, using it to explain a variety of outcomes includ ing 
trust, participation and accountability.  Park and Blenkinsopp (2011), for example, characterise 
transparency as an independent variable in the corruption-trust relationship, whilst Curtin and 
Meijer (2006) portray it as a linking mechanism between policy making and input legitimacy.  
Indeed, with such a breadth of outcomes, the ‘complex dynamics of transparency' (Meijer, 
2012) cut across academic disciplines with scholars variously analysing transparency as a 
driver of EU accountability (Brandsma and Schillemans, 2013: Fox, 2010); trust 
(Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013); participation (Harrison and Sayogo, 2014); legitimacy (Curtin 
and Meijer, 2006; Meijer, 2012); democracy (Schmidt, 2013; Heald, 2006) and good 
governance (Hood, 2006).  This article does not directly consider e-transparency’s links to 
these associated concepts, rather it seeks to explain the views of those involved in the EU policy 
process concerning the purpose and perceived effectiveness of e-transparency. 
Effectiveness of e-transparency 
Understanding the extent to which e-transparency is effective is, of course, complex, and would 
normally invite a framework through which the effectiveness can be assessed.  For this study, 
however, different groups of actors view transparency as having varying purposes, so 
identifying a single measure that captures the effectiveness of e-transparency is problematic.  
For example, the criteria for assessing the effectiveness of e-transparency in facilita t ing 
institutional accountability would differ from the criteria seeking to assess the effectiveness of 
transparency as a driver of public participation.  To accommodate these different criteria, this 
article uses the term effectiveness to describe: the extent to which the e-transparency tools 
deliver their perceived benefits.   
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Data gathering approach 
Before undertaking interviews with those involved in the policy process, it was necessary to 
have an initial understanding of the EU’s stated rationale for providing information through 
online transparency tools.  To achieve this, a textual analysis of a sample of transparency-
related documentation was undertaken.  In order to manage a large number of documents, only 
those published during or after the Barroso Commission were included in the initial search.  
Whilst it was recognised that this would exclude some important transparency documents such 
as the 2001 White Paper on Governance, and Regulation 1049/2001 on Public Access to 
Documents, it was considered that taking the Barroso Commission’s 2005 launch of the 
European Transparency Initiative (ETI) as a starting point was justified, given the importance 
of the ETI as a transparency milestone and given that it was unlikely that earlier documents 
would have directly affected interview participants.    
To identify relevant documents, two databases were searched: the European Parliament’s 
Register of Documents and the Register of European Commission Documents.  Document 
search criteria included reference to the terms ‘EU transparency’; 
‘Parliament/Commission/Institutional transparency’ or ‘European Transparency Initiative’ in 
the title and a publication date after 1 Jan 2005.  The searches yielded 83 and 59 documents 
respectively.  Using the databases’ own algorithms to sort the documents by relevance, the 
top 15 per-cent of documents from each database was examined (n = 21).  The documents 
included, but were not limited to, those relating to the ETI, including a transcript of 
Commissioner Kallas’ Nottingham speech; the original ETI Green Paper; ETI-related press 
releases and documents pertinent to the public consultation.  The document analysis mapped 
instances of official EU documents using terms commonly found in the transparency 
literature including participation, democracy, accountability and legitimacy.  These terms 
were used to create the typology for the themes emerging from analysis of the interview 
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transcription.  To illustrate, analysis of the ETI Green Paper shows transparency most 
frequently linked to participation (8 instances), then accountability (7) and legitimacy (6), but 
shows little linkage between transparency and anti-corruption (1).     
To identify interview participants, the EP website was used to break down the membership of 
those committees likely to have a particular interest in transparency.  These included the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee; the Petitions Committee and the Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs Committee, with priority given to targeting the Chair, Rapporteur and Shadow 
Rapporteur of these committees.  To identify relevant Commission officials, transparency 
advocates were asked to identify officials and Directorates with whom they had most 
dealings as this was considered a strong indicator of an interest in transparency issues2.    
In total, 63 semi-structured elite interviews were conducted between March 2013 and February 
2014 with Commission and EP Officials, MEPs and transparency campaigners.  MEPs were 
drawn from across political groupings and EU member states (MS).  Commission officia ls 
represented six different Directorates-General.  The majority of transparency groups involved 
in this research are Brussels-based, although interviews were also conducted with transparency 
groups based in Spain, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
At the start of each interview, participants were informed that the context of the research project 
was an analysis of the rationale for and the effectiveness of the various online processes 
introduced to increase the transparency of EU policy making.  Interview questions initia l ly 
investigated participant’s views around EU transparency in general, before examining their 
attitudes to e-transparency in particular.  The transparency coding scheme at Table 2 was used 
to assign responses to one or more of the linked themes explored in the transparency literature 
and these linked themes were used as indicators for the purpose of transparency.   
 
10 
 
Table 2. Transparency coding scheme. 
Transparency’s linked 
themes 
Associated with 
Transparency and 
Accountability  
Brandsma et al., 2016; Fox, 2010 
Transparency and Democracy  Heald, 2006, Schmidt, 2013. 
Transparency and Governance Hood, 2006 
Transparency and Legitimacy  Curtin and Meijer, 2006; Meijer, 2012 
Transparency and Participation  Harrison and Sayogo, 2014 
Transparency and Trust   Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013 
 
Interview transcripts were analysed in order to reveal whether, and to what extent, the linking 
themes established in the document analysis and the academic literature and summarised at 
Table 2 were cited by those closely engaged with the policy process.   
Where the exact term was not used, responses were allocated to the function closest in meaning.  
For example, the term ‘citizen engagement’ was assigned to ‘participation’ and ‘increased  
confidence’ to ‘trust’.   
Findings 
Amongst all participants, trust and accountability were the most frequently cited linking themes  
when considering the purpose of transparency.  However, more granular analysis of the 
interview data revealed clear differences in the rationale for e-transparency according to actor 
type.  This can, of course, be partly attributed to the different numbers and varying lengths of 
the interviews conducted with participants from each group.  More significant for this study is 
the relative importance of the various purposes attributed by each actor type.  This is depicted 
at Figure 1 below.   
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Figure 1. Purpose of e-transparency by actor type. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, MEPs used terms associated with trust most frequently, whilst Commiss ion 
Officials more often referred to participation.  Conversely, campaigning groups focussed 
chiefly on e-transparency’s links to accountability, with a particular stress on its function in 
ensuring that the Commission is held accountable.  The next section explores these groups’ 
different views as to the purpose of e-transparency in more depth.  
European Commission and European Parliament officials 
It was clear that e-transparency’s links to participation were prevalent amongst unelected 
officials at both the EP and the Commission.  Commission officials, in particular, viewed e-
transparency as a means of enhancing opportunities for citizens to engage in the policy process.  
A number specifically referred to various online tools associated with the European Citizens’ 
Initiative (ECI) as an example of an innovative e-transparency tool.  In particular, three officia ls 
singled out the online transparency portal on the Europa website as an example of the 
Commission’s commitment to transparency in general and to e-transparency in particular.    
Beyond its perceived role in enhancing citizen participation, some officials also stated that the 
Commission uses e-transparency as a means of increasing its legitimacy by providing greater 
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access opportunities for EU citizens.  It is not clear, however, how this increased legitimacy 
operates, given that a relatively small proportion of citizens make use of these greater access 
opportunities; a point tacitly acknowledged in one official’s observation: 
It’s completely underestimated, the level of transparency...you can see all the 
forms...you can follow all the debates from your home, if you want to.  But hardly 
anyone does, in practice, which is not surprising.  I think [for most people] the 
newspaper is enough.3  
Another participant echoed this view but also acknowledged that the transparency mechanisms 
are used by specialists, whilst another took the view that the degree of transparency of the EU 
policy processes compared favourably against policy transparency in some MSs:   
I think the decision-making process is very transparent.  You can follow the 
legislative process...and this is used by organised civil society, by interest 
groups...far more than by the public, and it is not, unfortunately, always used by 
the media.4  
The EU has a very transparent process.  You can follow the legislative process, 
access all the documents from you home.  I do not find the same level of 
transparency in my government in [EU MS].  The transparency here is far stronger 
than in most member states.  The people are able to see how open is the process 
in the EU.5  
When considering recent measures taken by the Commission to increase e-transparency, five 
officials singled out the Europa website.  Claiming to be ‘one of the largest sources of 
information in the world’ (Europa, 2016), the Europa portal contains over six million pages 
and receives 1.7 million visits each month, although it should be noted that the system captures 
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data for each unique visit rather than unique visitors, meaning that multiple visits by the same 
individual are counted separately (Europa, 2016)6.  Nonetheless, Europa acts as a single access 
point which provides multiple links to the institutions’ websites and to facilities such as 
Europarl TV - discussed below.  Additionally, Europa has hosted a dedicated transparency 
portal since 2011.  Although this portal does not provide any new transparency systems, it 
allows users to link to pre-existing e-transparency tools from a single access point.  Thus, 
through the transparency portal, users can access most of the EU’s searchable databases, its 
public consultations, Commission impact assessments, the online registers and so forth.  
Interestingly, Commission officials identified this portal as a transparency gain for organised 
groups, rather than EU citizens: 
We have the transparency portal.  It’s just a one stop shop to find all the other 
portals but from here you can see all aspects of transparency...even the 
beneficiaries of EU funds...it allows the media or civil society to compare the 
declared policy objective to the reality.  And, of course, these groups use the portal 
to further their campaigns - to create dissatisfaction, if you like.7  
When asked to comment on whether they considered the e-transparency tools to be effective 
in delivering an increase in citizen participation, Commission officials seemed resigned to the 
situation where the transparency tools are chiefly used by societal and campaigning groups 
rather than individuals:   
 Of course, the average citizen does not look at [the transparency register], but that 
 is not the real problem.  The real problem is that people do not know the information 
 is available to them.  So they just think the EU is secretive.8 
Nonetheless, despite its apparent acknowledgement that there is limited demand for 
information about EU processes from its citizens, the Commission continues to promote and 
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prioritise transparency as a means of increasing EU legitimacy and citizen participation.  For 
the EU’s elected representatives, however, the rationale was quite different, with the emphasis 
instead placed on transparency’s links to trust or related terms.   
Members of the European Parliament   
MEPs from across political groupings and of different nationalities shared a view that e-
transparency played a critical role in enhancing trust in the institutions, with four citing the 
example of the MEP’s online Register of Interest as evidence of the EP’s commitment to 
greater transparency.  Several MEPs specifically referred, in this context, to ‘rebuilding trust’, 
a phrase that alludes to the 2011 ‘cash for amendments’ story published by the Sunday Times.  
On this issue, some MEPs displayed a considerable level of unease and sensitivity - even 
defensiveness - when discussing the link between transparency and trust in the EP.  This 
sensitivity may explain the responses to the interviews’ seemingly innocuous initial question 
which asked interviewees to explain the purpose of transparency.  Two such responses are 
quoted in full below: 
We have to be transparent because we do an important job and we work hard.  We 
work hard for citizens and we try to engage with them.  And of course, we want 
them to engage with us.  The Sunday Times approached many of us, you know?  
And they only found three...of course that is three too many....but only three.  But 
of course they [the Sunday Times] don’t tell you that.9  
Transparency is vital.  It’s about trust...in the institutions...in the processes.  We 
have rules here...we have regulations and codes of conduct...and most of us 
understand these.  But the public don’t understand these - they just read the 
newspapers...they see the Sunday Times and think “they are all like this”. 
Transparency is how we show them we’re not.10   
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In the context of a series of questions relating to Eurobarometer data on trust in the EU, some 
MEPs remarked that the EP consistently polls as being the most open of the institutions, again 
citing Europarl TV as evidence of this.  Uniquely amongst the EU institutions, the EP 
broadcasts much of its activity in real time on Europarl.  An online streaming service, rather 
than a conventional television station, Europarl was launched in 2008 and broadcasts EP 
sessions and Committee hearings live, in addition to educational programmes, debates and 
interviews with  MEPs and commentators.  Although created by the EP, the running of Europarl 
TV is actually outsourced to a production company with independent journalists presenting its 
programmes.  Interviewees were asked their opinion as to the value of Europarl TV as a 
transparency tool.  Whilst most MEPs felt that the facility makes a positive transparency 
contribution by providing information to EU citizens, a number also stated that its low viewing 
figures limited its use as an information provider: 
It has opened up the process for sure, although nobody can claim it’s watched by 
millions.  But, then again, it isn’t a private channel living by the size of its 
audience.11  
A small proportion of EP interviewees had a negative view of the Europarl streaming platform, 
generally with reference to its €9 million running costs.  One response, in particular, suggested 
that the debate around the introduction of Europarl TV was highly charged and somewhat 
politically divisive: 
They [The European People’s Party] don’t like it [Europarl TV] and say that it’s 
all propaganda but that’s because they have their own version. Great, but if you 
want to see bloody propaganda watch EPP TV, which talks about debates in the 
EP as if there were only EPP members.12  
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Whilst the quotation above seems to indicate a significant level of political sensitivity around 
the introduction of Europarl TV, the streaming service was often cited by MEPs as evidence 
that the EP has a greater commitment to e-transparency than the Commission: 
 We have this Europarl TV now.  People can see what goes on in this place [EP].  
 They can watch the committees, the plenary…all the proceedings.  People  can 
 see most of our work, if they want to.  Very few people watch, of course,  but 
 they can.  That’s the difference between us and the  Commission. The 
 Commission has its committees closed off…there is no public access.  Ours are 
 in the public view - we have nothing to hide.13  
In this response, it is clear that this MEP sees the purpose of Europarl TV as a means of building 
trust in the EP by providing a window on the EP’s activities whilst also enhancing the EP’s 
transparency credentials vis a vis the Commission.  When MEPs were asked to comment on 
whether they considered the e-transparency tools to be effective in increasing citizen trust in 
the EP, there was a recognition that few private citizens actually access the information 
provided through the EP’s e-transparency tools:   
Well, the [European Parliament] website is effective for those that use it, I 
suppose.  But it is mostly used by campaigners and journalists looking for a story, 
and the way they report things does not really increase trust.  So transparency 
serves interested parties, for the most part.  Citizens do not know about the 
information available to them.14  
For those operating within the EU institutions - elected representatives and officials - trust and 
participation were cited as the main purposes of the e-transparency processes.  Participants 
from these groups made little mention of a link to accountability: an aspect of particular interest 
to campaigning groups.  
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Campaigning groups 
A number of Brussels-based campaigning groups have areas of activity which particula r ly 
focus on the corporate sector.  These groups promote EU transparency as a means of achieving 
a wider campaigning end: that is, transparency is its extraneous aim.  To illustrate, the European 
Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ) campaigns for tighter regulation on financial disclosure 
by multi-national companies (ECCJ, 2016) and uses the EU’s transparency tools to identify 
instances of multi-national company (MNC) representation on the EU advisory committees 15.   
In this regards, ECCJ is fairly typical of societal groups.  It campaigns for greater transparency 
of EU policy-making insofar as this helps it scrutinise corporate involvement in financ ia l 
regulation.  Similarly, the campaigning group Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE) advocates 
greater EU transparency as this supports the gathering of data to aid the delivery of core projects 
such as its bio-diversity and climate justice programmes. 
Other groups, however, have EU transparency as an intrinsic aim: it is not used as a means to 
further a wider campaigning objective, but as an end in itself.  Here EU transparency is used to 
monitor and publicise the relationship between the EU institutions - particularly the 
Commission - and the corporate sector across a range of policy areas.   For example, the 
Brussels-based group Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) and a closely related group the 
Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics (ALTER-EU) are well established 
transparency campaigners and both are adept at using the EU’s own transparency processes to 
identify and publicise instances of meetings or informal contacts between Commission officia l s 
and individuals from the corporate sector.  Indeed, this is the groups’ raison d’ etre with 
ALTER-EU’s stated role as representing members ‘concerned with the increasing influence 
exerted by corporate lobbyists on the political agenda in Europe’ (ALTER-EU, 2016).  
Similarly, CEO’s logo includes a strapline ‘Exposing the power of corporate lobbying in the 
EU’ (CEO, 2016).  In the conduct of their operations, both groups adopt a dual role in 
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monitoring and publicising the relationship between the institutions and corporate bodies.  As 
such, it is perhaps unsurprising that interviewees from societal groups cited accountability as 
the principal function of EU transparency.   
Transparency is what we do - it is how we hold the [EU] bodies accountable.  
That’s true for us and it’s true for other groups like us.  We all use transparency 
to watch them [the EU institutions] and to expose the links between the 
Commission and big business.16  
This closeness between corporate and institutional actors was a frequently recurring theme in 
interviews with members of societal groups.  Indeed, some participants from these groups 
acknowledged the paradox whereby they use data obtained from the EU’s own transparency 
tools to identify and publicise instances of a supposedly opaque relationship between the 
institutions and the corporate sector.       
 Well, it is true that a lot of information in our reports comes from analysing the 
 [EU’s] websites.  But we identify unhealthy relationships and we raise the profile 
in public.  Few citizens access these websites, so we do this for them.  We hold 
the Commission to account for the public.17  
In this response, the transparency group’s representative recognised the limited extent to which 
the transparency tools are used by individual EU citizens and openly stated that the group acts 
as a proxy for public scrutiny. In terms of assessing the effectiveness of e-transparency 
measures, the same participant suggested that that the quality and extent of the group’s scrutiny 
was affected by the accuracy of the information provided through the e-transparency tools.  
We need accurate data if we are able to properly hold [the Commission] to account 
for the public.  Of course, most of that data is supplied by the Commission itself.  
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We check the accuracy as much as we can, but we are a small group, you know?  
So you could say that our ability to hold the Commission to account depends on 
the quality of the information the Commission publishes.18  
For societal groups, then, e-transparency provides the means for them to monitor the 
relationship between the institutions and corporate bodies, rather than a mechanism to allow 
the activities of the transparency advocates to be observed by outsiders:   
So for us, transparency is a tool to expose excessive influence by very small 
minority groups like corporate leaders…it allows us to scrutinise activity and to 
document and publicise one sided decision-making.19  
With their emphasis on monitoring the institutions, it is perhaps unsurprising that interview 
participants from societal groups overwhelmingly privileged the role of transparency in 
enhancing accountability. It was, however, striking that these individuals characterised the role 
of their groups as acting as a proxy for the public and that they systematically use the EU’s 
own transparency processes to monitor and publicise the relationship between the Commiss ion 
and the corporate sector.  
Discussion 
In terms of the views as to the primary purpose of e-transparency, the distinction between 
unelected officials and elected representatives was clear, as was the marked difference between 
the views of those operating inside the institutions and those campaigning from outside.  
Officials at both the EP and Commission took a view that the degree of transparency of the 
legislative process compares favourably to that in some MSs.  This suggests that it is only by 
direct comparison with the situation in MSs that enhanced EU e-transparency tools can lead to 
legitimacy gains. Commission officials tended to assume a link between e-transparency and 
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the EU’s legitimacy, although the linking mechanisms were not clear.  In Curtin and Meijer’s 
exploration of the linkages between these ideas, they suggest that greater transparency leads to 
social acceptance of the policymaking structures and that this - in turn - leads to greater input 
legitimacy (Scharpf, 2009; Curtin and Meijer, 2006).  For e-transparency, however, this social 
acceptance will only occur if there is a public appetite for utilising the transparency tools in the 
first place.  Expressed more simply, using e-transparency tools to increase the public visibility 
of EU processes will not lead to legitimacy gains unless there is sufficient public interest in the 
processes in the first place.  Indeed, by focussing chiefly on the provision of legislat ive 
transparency - often technical and requiring some understanding of the EU’s institutiona l 
workings - the e-transparency mechanisms may actually deter engagement by the non-
specialist, invalidating the intended legitimacy gains.   
Several Commission officials suggested that the availability of information through the e-
transparency mechanisms is evidence of an open process.  In advancing the European Citizen’s 
Initiative as an example of innovative transparency, Commission officials cited an example of 
an online tool designed to provide an access point for citizen engagement.  This supports the 
case that, for the Commission, the main purpose of e-transparency is to facilitate participat ion.  
However, whilst it is acknowledged that the ECI is a novel and imaginative means of 
facilitating transnational participation, as a transparency tool, its use is limited.  It serves the 
Commission’s participatory function of e-transparency by providing access to the views of 
those citizens who choose to participate, but it does nothing to allow the citizens to observe the 
conduct of activities within the institution: the accountability function.   
In terms of the transparency portal hosted on the Europa website, Commission officia ls 
acknowledge it does not add any new transparency systems, rather it acts as a ‘one stop shop’, 
allowing users to view pre-existing e-transparency tools from a single access point.  As such, 
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evaluating the impact of this portal illustrates the difficulty of trying to capture the effectiveness 
of e-transparency systems through a single conceptual lens. 
It was striking how often MEPs favourably compared the EP’s e-transparency processes to 
those at the Commission.  This would seem to indicate that, despite an increase in both formal 
and informal ties operating at the institutional level (Egeberg et al., 2014), some inter-
institutional enmity remains amongst the individual actors involved.  Overall, MEPs 
overwhelmingly saw e-transparency’s principal function as enhancing and rebuilding trust in 
the EU in general, and in the EP in particular.   
Transparency campaigners operating outside the institutions had a quite different 
understanding of the rationale for the use of e-transparency.  Broadly speaking, they saw its 
value as providing a means of exposing the relationship between the institutions and the 
corporate sector and thus to hold the EU institutions accountable.  Interestingly, these groups 
use the Commission’s own e-transparency tools to monitor and report on this relationship.  
Clearly, there would seem to be a paradox where a group uses an e-transparency tool introduced 
to further citizen trust in the EU to identify shortcomings and present these as institutiona l 
failings: an intriguing aspect of the subject and one worthy of wider consideration.  
This article has shown that different policy actors have quite different understandings of the 
purpose of e-transparency.  For this article, with its empirical focus, it is the differences 
between the groups of actors that are significant.  Despite these differences, however, when 
asked whether they considered e-transparency to be effective, all interview groups shared a 
common view: that limited citizen engagement with the information provided through e-
transparency processes reduced its effectiveness.   
For MEPs, there was clear acknowledgement and some evident frustration that the e-
transparency tools intended to (re) build citizen trust in the EP are used chiefly by organisat ions 
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and specialists rather than private citizens, with some MEPs suggesting that the real challenge 
for transparency providers is in making citizens aware of the information that is availab le .  
Commission officials, too, recognised that few citizens actually choose to access the 
information provided, yet expressed less frustration at this.20  This acceptance of a lack of 
citizen engagement does, however, seem to undermine Timmerman’s view that transparency 
provides the means to reconnect with sceptical citizens.   
For the campaigning groups, the lack of citizen engagement in the EU was a given.  Indeed, 
several participants from campaigning groups suggested that the work of their group increases  
the effectiveness of the EU’s e-transparency measures because the group acts as a conduit 
between the institutions and EU citizens.  For these groups, any lack of effectiveness of e-
transparency is not a result of low citizen engagement but restricted group capacity, with 
campaigning groups having only limited resources to monitor the institutions, and often being 
dependent on the EU’s own transparency tools to undertake this task.  
Clearly then, any single e-transparency measure will have its own set of stakeholders - both 
advocates and critics - each of which assesses whether a measure is effective differently (Cini, 
2008).  Identifying the measure that captures the effectiveness of e-transparency is therefore 
problematic, as this will vary between actors.  In this study, for example, the criteria used to 
assess the effectiveness of e-transparency as a means of facilitating institutional accountability, 
will differ from the criteria used to further public participation.  To help to identify these 
different criteria, table 3 advances a framework for e-transparency providers to assess how the 
e-transparency tools can meet the differing needs of transparency users.  In essence, it proposes 
that providers should determine the principal purpose of an e-transparency measure before it is 
provided.  For example, if the purpose of providing information through e-transparency tools 
is to create greater trust in the process, a system of independent oversight should be in place to 
prevent inaccurate information being placed in the public domain (because this undermines the 
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trust it was intended to engender).  Likewise, an e-transparency measure intended to increase 
citizen participation should prioritise a user-friendly interface and multiple access points.   
Table 3. Framework for e-transparency information providers. 
 
Transparency 
theme 
Underlying 
purpose 
Condition/s Indicative indicator 
Participation  Enhance support of 
unelected bodies 
through provision 
of direct e-
democracy   
Ease of access - 
User friendliness 
of interface; 
Multiple e-
participation 
access 
points/gateways. 
Number of contributions to 
public e-consultations  
Trust  
 
Support for 
political 
incumbent; Limit 
demand for 
devolved decision-
making.  
External 
Oversight - 
System of 
independent 
scrutiny to ensure 
accuracy and 
completeness of 
information. 
Proportion of citizens 
expressing trust in 
Government/institutions - 
measured through, e.g. 
Eurobarometer/Asiabarometer 
etc. 
Accountability Prevention of 
malfeasance/abuse 
of power 
 
Potential for 
Sanctions - 
Potential 
imposition of 
(electoral or non-
electoral) 
sanctions for non-
compliance 
Public visibility of oversight 
processes and of remedial 
action taken  
Governance 
 
Universal 
applicability (and 
acceptance) of 
regulations 
Set standards - 
Clearly defined 
and measurable 
criteria of ‘good 
governance’ 
(which may be 
externally 
defined). 
Compliance with established 
‘good governance’ criteria 
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Although Table 3 above is based on responses of the actors and issues in this study, the model 
can be adapted to delineate and categorise the conflicting functions of e-transparency more 
widely.  By doing this, transparency providers can take into account the varying requirements 
of the different end users in order to assess the effectiveness of e-transparency. 
Conclusion 
This article set out to explore how different policy actors understand the meaning of 
transparency and assess its effectiveness.  The article argued at the outset that, in effect, the EU 
has multiple transparencies reflecting diverse actor interests.  The research has demonstrated 
that the measure of the effectiveness of e-transparency varies by actor.  It has shown that, 
collectively, the different actors involved in the policy process attribute both transparency and 
e-transparency with multiple benefits and both they are seen as enhancing the EU in numerous 
ways.  Thus the e-transparency tools are considered a way of increasing citizens’ trust in the 
institutions, of providing citizens with a means of participating in the policy process, and of 
providing greater institutional accountability by opening up the workings of the EU to the 
scrutiny of campaigning groups. This illustrates that the multiple attributes of transparency, far 
from being mutually reinforcing, can be contradictory.  This article supports the position of 
those participants that argued e-transparency is a simply an ICT tool of general transparency 
and that both are, in and of themselves, a requirement of modern governance.  The EU’s 
multiple transparencies identified in this article are clearly a reflection of the different needs 
and demands of transparency stakeholders.  Nonetheless, it is crucial that these differences are 
identified and understood and that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to e-transparency is avoided.  
Given that relatively few EU citizens currently choose to access information through the e-
transparency processes, those responsible for the administration of e-transparency should 
consider who the end user will be and how they may choose to use the information provided.  
It is considered that the e-transparency framework advanced in this article might go some way 
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to supporting transparency providers in doing this.  Finally, it is recommended that 
consideration be given to introducing a system of independent oversight to check the accuracy 
and completeness of information placed in the public domain.  
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Notes. 
1 Spring 2014 Global attitudes survey, 71% of EU citizens agreed with the comment ‘My voice does not count in 
the EU’; 65% agreed with the comment ‘The EU does not understand the needs of its citizens’ (Pew Research 
Centre, 2016).  
2 Simply identifying transparency sympathisers amongst Commission officials was problematic, as these 
individuals’ views of e-transparency would not necessarily be representative.  To address this, transparency 
campaigners were asked to identify their ‘heroes’ and ‘vil lains’ amongst officials with an interest in issues 
around transparency.  This term had been used in a pilot interview to describe transparency advocates and 
opponents amongst officials and elected representatives.  It was therefore used as a means of identifying 
participants with an interest in transparency but also to ensure a mix of views. 
3 COM 24, Commission [Administrative officer], Mar 2013 
4 COM 26, Commission [Policy officer], Apr 2013 
5 COM 24, Commission [Head of unit], Mar 2013  
6 .  Furthermore, the 1.7 mill ion visits may not be a reliable measure of citizen engagement because those 
administering the site believe that it is mostly accessed by professionals, rather than the general public. 
7 COM 25, Commission [Policy officer], Mar 2013 
8 COM 24, Commission [Head of Unit], Mar 2013 
9 MEP 15, ALDE member, May 2013 
10 MEP22, EPP member, May 2013 
11 MEP9, GUE/NGL, May 2013 
12 MEP9, GUE/NGL, May 2013 
13 MEP11, ALDE member, Apr 2013 
14 MEP22, EPP member, May 2013 
15 SOC 16 – Campaigner [European Coalition for Corporate Justice], Nov 2013  
16 SOC18 - Campaigner [Access Info Europe], Feb 2014 
17 SOC 14, Campaigner [Corporate Europe Observatory], Oct 2013 
18 SOC 14, Campaigner [Corporate Europe Observatory], Oct 2013 
19 SOC20, Campaigner [Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation], Dec 2013  
20 Naurin (2010) identified this as a distinction between transparency - the availability of information - and 
publicity - the consumption of such information. 
                                                                 
